IN this war official and quasi-official statements of war aims are the shock troops of propaganda. During the last six months these pronouncements have increasingly embodied the claims of the belligerents to represent mankind's efforts to create a new social and economic order that will abolish the economic malaises and social injustices of the last twenty years. l From a study of these pronouncements the following facts will emerge: that the announcement of war aims of a social nature is a vital weapon of propaganda in this total war; that this weapon has been used by the enemy shrewdly, if with ru t hless inconsistency, for the purpose of creating disunity and class conflict within the democracies; that in this war of ideas Great Britain has chosen to fight on the defensiveat least in so far as official pronouncements are concerned-and has not as yet countered Hitler's specious "New World Order" with a potent dynamic of her own; that Great Britain's war aims, in so far as they deal with the defeat of the Nazi principle of force and with the rehabilitation of the conquered territories of our allies and of France, have been stated with sufficient clarity and vigour for the presen t, but that, in so far as they deal with mankind's struggle for eco nomic security, they probably have not been so stated. Such, at any rate, afe the conclusions of those who are putting pressure upon the British Government to sponsor a social dynamic 2 in order to mobilize behind the democratic cause the dispersed longi ngs of the masses everywhere for a greater measure of social justice and economic security.
own morale and hasten the disintegration of fascism and nazism in enemy and occupied territory by convincing people, specially the workers, that Great Britain with her allies-far from fighting to set back the clock and pr~serve a "discredited" status quo-is now, as she always has been) in the van of modern social and economic progress. They argue further, that to prove our bOllQ fidts we must define now the nature of the world order which we intend to create, jf not in detail at least with a greater measure of precision than we have as yet employed. Some proponents, though not all, believe that we should, even in the midst of war, not merely define our plans for a new democratic order, but actuall.y "begin the task of democratic revolution" in the belief that to do so "will produce in our own people the hope and exhilaration that give them, e. ven in danger and suffering, the power to endure; while the spectacle of great reforms so achieved is a challenge to the dictators to which they have no answer."3 In its more radical form, especially in labour, liberal, and academic circles, the argument often takes the form of a specific query: "Is the new European order to be founded upon state capitalism, upon private enterprise, or upon a combination of both?"' . In support of the general argument the statement is made that this war is not merely an old-fashioned war for power and territory, fought by nations confined within boundaries, but that, in the words of The Times (London), it "carries within it a clash of social orders and social purposes," so that lithe strains of social and international policy have mingled"; that it is in one important aspect a world civil war in 'which <;onflictjng social and economic theories compete for the emotional allegiance of the masses, made sensitive to new social ideas by two decades of intense propaganda. Mr Harold Laski puts the case for a social dynamic succinctly;
We are at war with an enemy who seeks to build a new social order in Europe.
That it is a social order in which the:: common peoples of Europe wilt be .the serfs of a Ge rman feudal empire doe::s not alter the fact that it wiU be, if he wi ns, a new social orde::r, To beat him, we need not weapons merely, but weapons in the service of a great idea; (or material (orces conquer by the faith behind their use. To defeat the ene::my we:: must pe::rsuad e no t merely those whom he has conquered, but, not less, those also who are the inst ruments of his conquests, that our victory offers them a better life, a rich er prospect of enduring peace, than any victory he can win,li lHarold Lask,i, in the Picturt PO!I, Nov. 9, 1940. 4See Note B at end of article.
SPicfurt Post, Nov. 23) l Q40.
Such, brieRy, is the case for adopting a social dynamic as a measure in the war of morale. It must be admitted that its , advocates have not always scrupulously stated, much less refuted, the case against it. A moment's reflection will reveal the princi pal objection. Regarded purely as a measure of war morale, and quite as ide (rom intrinsic merits which it may or may not possess, there is a real danger that a social dynamic, far from cementing the will of the democracies into the unity necessary for victory, might intensify divisions of opinion and conRicts of interest that should be kept in the background during the war. Probably for that reason Mr Churchill has refused to state, except in very general terms, Great Britain's aims for world reconstruction after the war.
It would be a mistake to represent public opinion in the democracies as solidly and decisively arrayed in opposing ranks, for or against an announced. social dynamic. Among the proponents probably the majority realize the necessity of making haste slowly and with caution; while among the opponents of anY extreme form of social dynamism are many who, realizing that we must take the' o ffensive, or at the very least defend ourselves in the war o f morale, believe that democratic go vern ments should, at the right time and in the right circumstances, give the seal of thei r approval to a social trend, though not to any definitive blueprint for a new social order.
Should we meet Hitler's specious pretensions' to be the world's apostle of soci al ism with a counter dynamic of our own? We mus t not forget for an instant that the purpose of Hitler's propaganda is never primarily that of inteUectual argument; it is a military weapon. The purpose of his "new world order" utterances is to place us on the horns of a dilemma. They do not represent his real intention for the world, which is to establish a world caste system. 7 These utterances concerning a· "new world order" are intended to sap our moral stamina by creating the legend that 'It ;s hardJy necessary to poi nt out the inconsistency oof these prete nsions.
Before the Wllr it ;uited his purpose, as the best mea ns of exploiting the class s truggLe in the democracies, to pose to banking and industri , d in terests as the de fen der of private property agains t collec ti vism . Since the war he has reversed the direction of his propaganda, seeking to exploit the discon tent of the masses with the social order, and to di scredit the leaders of the democracies, si nce it is the masses who carry the guns ana man the work benches. The chllnge of tactic h:\.S also its ob vious rdatio n with his foreign policy as rega rds Russia.
fer. Rauschning, Hil ltr S1!tdJ, p. 50.
while Germany has a plan to cure the economic malaises of the world, the "corrupt and tottering democracies" have none. But if, to counter the lie, we sponsor an extreme social d" ynamic, that too he believes he can exploit to his advantage, just as in France he profited by the opposition of the "haves" to M. Blum's social dynamic.
Fortunately the dilemma is more apparent than real; if we adopt the traditional middle way of democracy, we shall escape between the horns. OUf CQurse lies neither in extremism nor in inertia; either would intensify the class struggle and deliver us into the hands of Hitler's and Stalin's trouble-makers, who seek to bring about lCthe downfall of democratic, constitutional government; regardless of the consequences to the fate of Great Britain and her allies.... Though strategy dictates the necessity or placing the democratic cause in the mid-current of world evolution, extremism would be poor tactics. We may, however, fairly accept the principle of a new social order firmly based on democracy, without compromising our unity by a premature discussion of details. The paramount necessity of winning the war must be the guiding principle in determining to what extent we should officially sponsor a new social orq.er: we should move towards a social dynamic only so far as will contribute to winning the war by strengthening our morale-no further. To fix the point at which a soci al dynamic would overreach its usefulness and, by extremi sm, create dangerous disunity, will not be easy. To do so will caU for sound judgment in assessing public opinion. Moreover, the announcement of a dynamic will have to be carefulli timed.'
Has not a swift evolution already taken place in Great Britain under the pressure of war, in the characteristic British way of not recognizing changes until they are accom plished facts? The problem of distribution is boldly met; profits are being controlled; the power of money in the hands of the individual is curbed; nutrition and health, under the stress of the air war and the blockade, are recognized for the really vital nati onal concerns they have always been; the government has admitted its responsibility (i n so far as lies in its power) to undertake the rehabilitation of victims of the air war, etc. If these things are true (and they are also true, though to a far lesser extent, in Canada), and if Great Britain is feeling her way towards a measure of state control of economy and perhaps towards a form of state socialism under democracy-why should she not publicly embrace what is becomi~g a fact, in order to prove to otlier peoples that she is fighting not only for the freedoms of democracy," but also for a social and economic ideal? Possibly the acts of the British government will speak to the British people with a more potent voice than any official pronouncements. But, again, if we hope to win other people to our cause, possibly the ~idea (propaganda) is as important as the act. The evolution of social" and political forms does not take place independently of acts of the human will. Trusted leaders can and should settle the direction of evolution more decisively in war than in times of peace. We may be sure that if our leaders fail to do so, the enemy will profit by the failure.
Assuming the necessi ty of some kind of social dynamic, a detailed blueprint for world rehabilitation on the basis of a juster economjc and social world order is beyond our ability to produce in a moment's time. No one should expect it of us. Evolution through the struggle of different currents of public opinion must have its word to say here-unless we cease to be a democracy. But what may reasonably be expected of us is t hat we prove to the world by ~word and deed that we mean business and that democracy, far from being equated with "plutocracy," is the leader in soci al and economic progress. The statement of soci al aims must be sufficiently specific and vital to arouse the offensive spirit without impairing democracy's claim to be the political philosophy of common sense and the opponent of all tyranny whether by individuals or by majorItIes.
Much should be left to the operation of social evolu-~ tion, and such a dynamic, while a definite H act of will," would have to be, at the present time, to a certain extent symbolic. loon e of President Roosevelt's four freedoms is "freedom from want" (speec h of March 15).
II. A Social Dynamic for Canada?
While the general terms of the problem, as stated above; are as relevant to Canada as to any democracy, certain aspects of the problem, peculiar to Canada, require more detailed consideration.
The most important of these is the conservative attitude of Canadians toward soci al change. Canada, like the United States,
is not yet geographically in the front line of the war. She has had no bombing raids to act as a catalyst to social evolution, and the Battle of Britain, though it is a stimulant to Canada's social imagination and a challenge to her creativeness, is still a story read, not a story lived. Superficially the attitudes of individual Canadians towards a social dynamic might appear to a British visitor not dissimilar to those of corresponding people in corresponding walks of life in Great Britain. Delving more deeply, however, into our institutions and our ways of thought, such a visitor would discover important differences between the two countries in their attitude towards social questions. The differences which incline Canadians to be more conservative with respect to change, may be summarized as follows:
The Canadian Character. In the material development of the country Canadians have shown initi:;a.tive and vision, but in matters of culture, government, and social evolution, they .have been imitative rather than ·creative. In sud; matters we seem to show a curious distrust of ourselves, perhaps because we are overshadowed by two mature nations, Great Britain and the United States.
World political and social trends are always reRected in Canadabut usu ally later rather than sooner: Canadians seldom initiate them.
The Political Situation. The Dominion government is still, as (ar as the exigencies of war permit, laissez-faire in temperament.
There are a number of good reaso ns for this. The Labour S ituation. Organized labour in Canada is less powerful than in Great Britain or the United States, though its power is growing. Unioniza tion, f~r example, must be fought for more bitterly. Its political influence, though not negligible, is :indirect; organized labour as a body has never "gone into politics." Moreover, in ternal divisions (between craft and industrial unionism, national and international unionism, Catholic and non-sectarian unionism) further weaken organized labour's political power.
The Altitude of Business. It would be inaccurate to say that business men do not contemplate the necessity for certain changes in the social and economic structure after the war; most of them do. But as practical men with more than a layman's knowledge of economics they are conscious of the difficulties involved in radical changes. They are inclin ed to view changes primarily from an economic rather than a social standpoint. For instance, while many (though not all) business men recognize t he need, at least for a time, of a controlled economy (perhaps under a measure of in ternational as well as national control), they are professionally inclined to regard thls an economic rather than a social measure and to believe that business prosperity will solve social malaises. Since to be successful in business means the ability to show a profit on invested capital, it is natural that business men should be suspicious of efforts in "normal times"1 to curb profits, to modify the capitalistic system, or in general to limit flfree enterprise." All this may, of cours" e, also be said of. business men in other democracies. In . Canada; however, there has as yet been neither a coalition government with labour nor a New Deal. Canadian business men want neither. In particular they are anxious to avoid in Canada, in the midst of war, the acute labour troubles which accompanied the early years of the New Deal in the United States. The change of government in Great Britain was acclaimed in the press principally because Canadians desired the leadership of Mr Churchill. The coalition with Labour and the Liberals is approved of as an act of unity in the face of the enemy. The social implications of the coalition with Labour have not yet been realized in Canada. It cannot be said that the economic views of the Labour party are supported by Canadian business men. Probably a majority of Canadian business men would approve of Mr Willkie's equating of democracy with "'free enterprise."! Recently, Senator Meighen, whose loyal support of the war effort is beyond question, aroused <tpposition (which was not confined to labour circles) when he protested against the influence that MrBevin exerts in the British government. "If property, profit, the reward of toil, the fundamen tal instinct of the human race to acquire, to have, to reach 'somewhere, is taken away, then I, for one, do not feel we have anything worth fighting for .'" Most people would agree that lWar taxation will lower the respective pre~war standards of Ii ving to a greater extent in the case of the receivers of dividend and salary than it will in the case of wage-earners in war industries, whose wages are p~gged to th e cost of living. Excess profits are taxed about 75 per cent. Proposals to tax them 100 per cent, made by the C.C.F. party, supported by the Conservative opposition, were defeated in the House by the government majority. The government claimed that to do so would cause injustices and would involve insuperable administrative problems .
SIn endorsing the President's plan for aiding Great Bntain, on Ja nua ry 12. Obviously the number of business men wh o equate democracy with fre e enterprise must be a matter of guess-work, though the financial press gives some indication. 3As quoted in the press. Senator Meighen overshot the mark in ascri bing such ultra-radical
intent. ions to Mr Bevin.
Canadian Dis/rust oj Propaganda. Taken as a whole the Canadian people is not yet convinced that this war is, in an important sense, a war of ideas, in which social dynamics-ours or the enemy's -may playa deci sive role. They are sti ll somewhat complacen tly of the opinion that "truth will prevail" in the minds of confused people by its own, not always concretely stated, validity and that there is no need to spend money in order to advertise-it. Canadian authorities are, in fact, to some extent still under the influence of the pre-war propaganda campaign agai nst " propaganda." The result of this is a tendency to regard a static defensive in the war of ideas as morally justified whereas any dynamic offensive is ipso facto specious "propaganda."
Presumably a social dynamic would be adopted in the interests, principally of two sorts of Canadians-working people and (armers. Both are elements o( the population without whose whole-hearted co-operation our war effort would be stuitified. Both su ffered severely du ri ng the years o( the depression. As a result of the industrial war effort working people are now, at least temporarily, in a more prosperous situation; that is not, however, true of the farmers . It will be useful t o consi der briefl y some of the ways in which the interests of labour and of farmers respectively affect the problem of announcing a social dynamic.
Labour. It is scarcely necessary to underline t he obvious (acts that unorganized labour desires an economic security which it does not possess, and that organized labour desires to preserve and increase the measure of security which it possesses." A social dynamic which convinces the working man that it can offer him greater security, a more equitable distribution of wealth, and an end to the fear of un employment, hunger, and destitution, which has bedevill ed him sin ce 1929, will set fire to his imagi nation and win his allegiance. "If this i~ a war (or democracy:' remarks an editorial in a labour magazi ne, {'then let us have democracy for the war" ; and this magazine goes on to cite a list of the things which labour wants during the war, including mainte,?ance of living standards, work for the unemployed, representation of labour and to enforce upon them this right of labour, would capital and employers "go on strike"? This is the sort of dilemma, in its most acute form, raised by the effort to implement a ~ocial dynamic.
Will labour be for long willing to lack the government's active support for this right? The answer for the present is, yes. But if the war is long, the time may corne when t he government will have to act as boldly as-any dictatorship, by making this concession to labour, whose power is growing, in the faith that a democratic ·government must trust the good sense of the governed-of labour leaders to exercise their power with restraint, and of e~ployers to make the sacrifice without r evolt if it becomes clearly necessary for the morale of the nation at war.
Farmer.r. A new social dynamic (or Canada would certainly
have to take in t o account the disconten ts of the farmer, particularly in view of the fac t that the prosperity of the Prairies, and indeed of the whole Dominion, depends upon the varying fortunes of the Western wheat farmer. In the East agriculture has been morc stable. But everywhere in Canada, as in the United States, the 'Canadian UniolliJl. Nov., 1940 . This quotation is characteristic of the more radical bbour leaders and of C.C.I<'. party speakers.
dThe problem is DOC unreal or ncademic. Legislation to enforce this ri ght upon labour is a part of the American New Deal (Wagner La bour Relations Act). farmer feels, rightly or wrongly, that he has been exploited by the rest of the population.
It is, however, more difficult to envisage a social dynamic which would enlist the farmer than is the case with the ' worker. The farmer in' Canada is usually an owner, not a peasant tenant. , As such he is an individualist . When he bands with his fellows to take action about some grievance, he is likely to do so sectionally rather than nationally. No Canadian farmer-owner wants anything like the Russian system of government ownership. A Canadian farmer, 'however much he may feel he is exploited by the capi talisti c system in industry, is himself at heart a capitalist; his land is his capital. He would be bitterly opposed to any social dynamic which increased the cost of commodities he must buy, or which set an arbitrary limit on the commodities he has to sell. It is important to remember that if Canada has become a great industrial country, it is still a great agricultu ral country whose most important export in peace-time is whea t. Taken as a whole, during Canada's industrialization the rise in the farmer's standard of living has not been commensurate with that of the urban and industrial population, and rela ti vely his degree of economic security has declined. The Canadian farmer is a capitalist who is also a "have_not" because, as com'pared with industrial capital, his does not pay a good dividend. The socialist party in Canada (the C.C.F.) has attempted to combine the interest of farmers and industrial workers . It will not succeed unless it bows to the inevitable (act th at the Canadian farmer is an individual owner of wealth. Any alternative would envisage the farmer in the rol e of a peasant.
If the aDove analysis of the Canadian situation is correct, the weight of evidence does not favour the adoption of a social dynamic as extreme as Mr Laski's. The risk of internal dissension is too great. That docs not, however, rule out the possibility of adopting a dynamic which would be in some respects symbolic during the war, but which would be sufficiently specific, and sufficiently supported by acts, to convince people that mankind's social creativeness is no longer fatalistically subservient to Hthe iron law of economics." In other words) should we not delibe.ra tely elect to support an evolution along humanitarian lines, and to direct it with intelligent foresight? In Canada, as elsewhere in the demo-cratie world, socially conscious people, whatever their position in life may be, and to whatever province they may belong,' are determined not only that Hitler and what he stands for shall be destroyed, but also that there shall be a remedy found for the economic and social maladies of the depression era, which made it possible for Hitler to seize power and hypnotize hi s own people and millions in other countries as well. The government and the' press have given public consideration to relief projects to tide over unemployment directly after the war. This foresight is, of course, commendable, but in so far asit envisages the inevitable return of depression and unemployment under the stalus quo it offers to labour a discouragement rather than the hope of a better world.
As a social dynamic it is certainly inadequate. It is a disquieting fact that a great many Canadians who are grimly determined to bend all their efforts to winning the war, are psychologically hampered by a gnawing pessimism about the future. The last war was lithe war to end war"; but it did not end war. What hope then is there that the results of this war will be an enduring peace? ("I suppose we shall win the war; we always do. . . . But we shall have another war twenty years hence.") Such pessimism corrupts the will to victory. To counter it and to stay our endurance during a long war in which Canada has not yet suffered, we shall have not only to make use of our material resources, but also to explore and mobiJize to the full our spiritual resources. We must) above all, arouse and renew faith in the world's future.
In conclusion it may be useful to consider briefly the auspices under which a social dynamic should be advanced. Inevitably, discussion of a social dynamic lends itself to a good deal of vagueness and wishful thinking on the part of people who "want something Germans, the Communists, have for years been placing their cells in labour movements, youth movements, and every kind of liberal movement. Moderate Canadians who would be willing to support a reasonable social dynamic would be,-for this reason, suspicious of the term itself as smacking of extreme radicalism; they would and do attach their hopes to the idea of democ ratic social evolution. There 1S a general belief that the word ·"democracy" connotes peaceful evolution (swift or slow as need demands)-bu t never revolution. There could be no finer justification of democracy than that belief. "Let us never glorify Revolution; statesmanship is the art of avoiding it.'" It would be folly to forget that we have always had a social dynamic-democracy. Democracy must be revitalized and released from bondage to the economic anomalies of the depression.
NOTE A. Official Statements oj War Aims
On our side the most import. ant of these have been made since the (ormation of the Coalition government; e.g. Mr Churchill's speech in Parliament on Oc tober 15, and his speech on D ecember 18 1 jn answer to Hitler's pronouncement on a new European Order (one of our aims is "to establish a state of society where the advantages and privileges which hitherto have . been. enjoyed by the few shall be far more widely shared by the men and youth of the nation as a whole"); also speeches by Mr Bevin and Mr Greenwood.. Important as background to these speeches are the writings of Hugh Dalton, H. G. Wells, Harold Laski, Sir Norman AngeU, Francis \Villiams, Edward Hulton, and many others; also the radio addresses of J. B. Priestley. Importan t too is the joint declaration by the heads of Churches in Great Britain, including the Roman Catholic Church, concerning the basic conditions of permanent peace; also the setting up of an official committee to study war aims and the naming of a labour minister, Mr Greenwood, to plan for post-war readjustments. . .. On the German side various pronouncements have been made by Goebbds, Hitler, and Ley (a ten-year programme for the "improvement of the social position of workers"), culminating in HitJer's "struggle of two worlds" speech . .
NOTE B. Mr Laski's Prov-amme
-Thus what Mr Laski calls (fa great domestic programme of social and economic legislation" is based on radical soc.ialism. We quote it as one of IGoldwin Smith, quoted by Sir Joh n Marriot t (Pi&Jur4 PPSf, Nov. 9) . Proponc=:nts for a revolutionary social dynam ic ("revolution by consent") claim that morale. depends upon a revolutionary mood, but the Communists within the democracies, revolutionists by milier. certainly contributed to the defeat of France. the more radical suggestions for a social dynamic: fI(l) Those things upon which our national life depends, the money power, transport, coal and power, the land, cannot be left to the hazards of private enterprise. (2) The rebuilding of Britain is not a matter in which the ground-landlord and the speculative jerry-builder can be pennitted to control. . (3) We cannot afford an educational system which ends the training of the b~lk of our citizens at the point where its creative possibilities begin. (4) W~have no right to make heaJth a direct function of economic position. (5) We cannot allow functionless ownership the dominating position it stiU possesses in OUf politics.
(6) We have, that is, to re-define the place of property in the statej and we have so to re-define it that the concept of democracy is applied beyond the plane of political forms merely, into those realms of social and economic life where it has genuine meaning in the lives of individual men and women" (Piclure Posl, Nov. 9, 1940) . Mr Laski would put this programme on the statute book, amid the clash of arms, in order to inaugurate a "revolution by consent." More moderate-and more characteristic-are the plans advanced in a series of articles in the English magazine Pielurt PoJl by various people, some well known, some obscure, from different walks of life (collected and reprinted in a pamphlet by the National Economic and Social Planning Association, 1721 Eye Street N.W., Washington, D.C.).
The purpose of the present article t it is hardly necessary to observe, is not to criticize specific plans, but to discuss the desirability of a social dynamic as a measure of war morale, and particularly the Canadian implications of the problem.
